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I. INTRODUCTION
An increase in global reliance on fossil fuels has prompted greater
discussion on energy security. For the United States, interest has focused
on ensuring that countries in the Western Hemisphere, which currently
supply roughly half of U.S. imports of crude oil and petroleum products,
remain stable sources of energy. While concerns have focused on political
instability and a rising interest in the hemisphere's energy resources by
China and India, the conversation centers on a hemispheric trend toward
resource nationalism. 2 Resource nationalism is exemplified by the global
trend of placing the world's oil reserves under the control of national oil
companies and out of reach of the international oil companies, except on a
low-margin, service-contract basis. This trend is prompting some Latin
American countries to make deliberate attempts to limit foreign investment
in their energy sector. For countries that continue to welcome foreign
investment, other legal policies, such as rules governing international
arbitration, are hampering foreign investment. Deliberate or not, these
policies lead investors to locate multimillion dollar energy investments
* Alexia Brunet, Ph.D., J.D., is a Visiting Assistant Professor, Northwestern University
School of Law and Special Counsel, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Contacting
author email: a-brunet@law.northwestern.edu.
** Juan Agustin Lentini, J.D., L.L.M., is an Associate at Marval, O'Farrell, & Mairal in
Buenos Aires, Argentina and a 2006 graduate of Northwestern University School of Law
L.L.M. Program.
1 Mark P. Sullivan & Clare M. Ribando, Latin America: Energy Supply, Political
Developments, and U.S. Policy Approaches, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REPORT
No. RL33693 (Oct. 17, 2006).
2 Peter Hakim, Is Washington Losing Latin America?, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 39 (2006).
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elsewhere.
This article considers Latin American attitudes towards rules
governing international arbitration. Latin American countries had
traditionally rejected arbitration as a means of settling disputes citing the
"Calvo Doctrine," a widely-adopted, anti-interventionist doctrine
formulated in the Nineteenth Century. This doctrine inspired widespread
use of contractual clauses limiting legal redress for foreigners in domestic
courts. For decades, Latin American used the doctrine to refuse ceding
jurisdictional control to foreign or domestic arbitral tribunals. This
isolation from international arbitration, however, would not last long.
The last fifteen years introduced a new economic order in Latin
America, prompting countries to pursue foreign direct investment as a new
path of economic development. As a result, countries enhanced measures
for protection of foreign investments including policies for fair and
equitable treatment of investments, non-discrimination and adequate
compensation for expropriated property. Within the realm of arbitration,
countries enacted changes in national and international policies to promote
the development of international arbitration as an effective means of dispute
settlement.
However, the implementation of an adequate legal framework was not
sufficient to guarantee the development of international arbitration in Latin
America. Policies discouraging the use of international arbitration and
enforcement of arbitral awards are re-surfacing to impede foreign
investment in energy sectors throughout Latin America. This is particularly
troubling at a time when concerns for resource nationalization and energy
security are mounting.
This article traces the development of international arbitration as a
means of settling international disputes in Latin America, lending a
historical perspective to the problems that international arbitration
practitioners face when dealing with international arbitration in Latin
America, particularly in the energy sector. We focus on four themes: (1)
the influence of foreign direct investment in the energy sectors of Latin
America on the development of international arbitration in Latin America;
(2) the rise of energy-related international arbitration disputes after Latin
American adoption of international arbitration; (3) the problems
encountered by international energy companies while enforcing arbitration
agreements or foreign arbitral awards before the national courts of selected
Latin American countries; and (4) the future of international arbitration in
Latin America in the context of the hemispheric movement toward resource
nationalization and national concerns over energy security. For the
purposes of this study, Latin America is defined by twenty countries
identified in the tables found in the Appendices to this article. The energy
sector includes companies engaged in the exploration, production,
marketing, refining and/or transportation of oil and gas products, plus coal.
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Section II begins with a discussion of Latin American attitudes
towards international arbitration, noting both the motivations behind Latin
America's historic rejection of international arbitration, and factors leading
to gradual embracing of international arbitration. Section III describes
efforts to encourage the use of international arbitration and the enforcement
of arbitration awards, respectively. Section IV presents the subsequent
result of these efforts-the proliferation of actions against Latin American
countries, particularly in the energy sector. This is followed by a discussion
of the difficulty of developing an arbitration culture in Latin America and
problems encountered with international arbitration in Latin America for
select countries in Section V. Section VI places the problems discussed in
previous sections within the context of concerns for resource nationalization
and more generally, concerns for energy security. Section VII provides
concluding remarks.
II. LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES' ATTITUDES TOWARDS
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
Historically, Latin American countries have been reluctant to accept
international arbitration as a means of dispute settlement. 3  Decades of
abstention from major international commercial arbitration conventions led
to a seemingly irreparable bias against international commercial
arbitration.4 Yet, over the last fifteen years, this situation has changed
radically.5
The increase of privatization of utility and energy companies
throughout Latin America, particularly in Brazil and Argentina, has
attracted considerable foreign direct investment to the continent. To
encourage further investment many developing countries have adopted a
legal framework that complies with demands made by capital exporting
states-such as the provision of a private right of action for investors
against host states through international arbitration. The following sections
describe the basis for initial Latin American rejection of international
arbitration and the economic forces which emerged to alter the situation.
3 Bernardo Cremades, Current Status of International Commercial Arbitration in Latin
America, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA: PAPERS
PRESENTED AT THE 1998 VANCOUVER IBA CONFERENCE, 1, 5 (Bernardo Cremades ed.,
Kluwer Law International 1999) [hereinafter Cremades, Commercial Arbitration].
4 Claudia Frutos-Peterson, International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America: As
Healthy as It Could Be?, State Bar of Texas, Alternative Dispute Resolution Section,
available at http://www.texasadr.org/intlarb.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
5 Horacio A. Grigera-Na6n, Latin America: Overcoming Traditional Hostility Towards
Arbitration, 477 PLI/CoMM 375, 377 (1988).
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A. The Rejection of Arbitration Under the "Calvo Doctrine"
Latin American's historic hostility to international arbitration has been
based on the "Calvo Doctrine."' The Calvo Doctrine was formulated by
Carlos Calvo, an Argentine diplomat and jurist, in the late Nineteenth
Century, as a reaction to foreign armed interventions in Latin America,
principally the French interventions in Mexico in 1838 and 1861. 7 Two
fundamental principles constitute the core of his doctrine: "First, that
sovereign states, being free and independent, enjoy the right, on the basis of
equality, to freedom from 'interference of any sort' ... by other states,
whether it be by force or diplomacy, and second, that aliens are not entitled
to rights and privileges not accorded to nationals, and that therefore they
may seek redress for grievances only before the local authorities."8 Many
Latin American countries incorporated aspects of the Calvo Doctrine in
their domestic and constitutional law.9
This doctrine led Latin American countries to incorporate the so-called
'Calvo clause' in many contracts with foreigners. This clause provides that
any dispute with the host country or its companies shall be submitted to
domestic courts and forbids recourse to diplomatic protection by the
aggrieved party. 10 As we later reveal in greater detail, remnants of this
doctrine still remain today and some lower courts in Latin America refuse
to cede their jurisdictional control over to foreign or domestic arbitral
tribunals. 1'
B. The New Economic Order and Gradual Acceptance of International
Arbitration
The Calvo Doctrine flourished for decades and most Latin American
6 See Robert Briner, Chairman, Int'l Court of Arbitration of the Int'l Chamber of
Commerce, Address at the 40th Anniversary of the Convention on the Recogniction and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (June 10, 1998), in ENFORCING ARBITRATION
AWARDS UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS, UNITED
NATIONS PUBLICATION No. E.99.V.2 (1998) at 8, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/NYCDay-e.pdf"
7 Jeanne M. Cook, International Arbitration in the Latin American Context-A
Comparative Look at Arbitration in Mexico and the United States, 3 V.J. 41, 48 (1999).
8 Denise Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of
the Calvo Principle: Equality of Foreign and National Investors, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
BuS. 1169, 1171-72 (1995) (citing DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF
INTER-AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 19-20 (1955).
9 Doak Bishop, The United States' Perspective Toward International Arbitration With
Latin American Parties, 8 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 63, 63-64 (1995).
10 Bernardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising Out of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin
America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues, 59 Disp.
RESOL. J. 78, 80 (2004) [hereinafter Cremades, Foreign Investment].
11 Cook, supra note 7, at 48.
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countries followed a path toward economic development focusing on
government ownership of key industries, coupled with national policies
favoring import substitution-a national economic strategy to build up a
domestic economy by emphasizing the replacement of imports by
domestically produced goods.1 2  However, changes in the economy
persuaded Latin American countries to embrace international arbitration.
The fall of the Soviet Union and multiple debt crises in Latin America in
the 1980s created severe economic difficulties for Latin American
countries.' 3 Faced with limited financing, rising inflation and economic
stagnation, the general perception was that the import substitution model for
development had failed.' 4  Most Latin American countries had no
alternative but to open up their economies to global markets and procure
capital through foreign direct investment. They accepted the new economic
order, subscribing to market oriented reforms and directives designed to
promote economic growth in Latin America, otherwise known as the
"Washington Consensus." 
5
Formulated to refer to the policy advice being addressed by
Washington-based institutions, such as the Inter-American Development
Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
("World Bank"), to Latin American countries as of 1989, the Washington
Consensus included a bundle of reforms aimed at increasing foreign
investment, encouraging privatization, promoting alternative dispute
resolution, furthering trade liberalization, redirecting investment towards
infrastructure, and protecting property rights.' 6  However, the regularly
cited benefits of arbitration-informality, confidentiality, neutrality, cost
12 Jeswald W. Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing
Role for Law in the Third World, 33 INT'L LAW. 875, 877-80 (1999).
13 Edward A. Fallone, Latin American Laws Regulating Foreign Investment, SB04 ALI-
ABA 323, 327 (1996).
14 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 178 (2005).
15 Salacuse, supra note 12, at 883 (noting that this set of new policies was advocated by
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, western bilateral aid agencies and
international commercial banks, and that these policies included: (i) Fiscal policy discipline;
(ii) Redirection of public spending toward education, health and infrastructure investment;
(iii) Tax reform; (iv) Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in
real terms; (v) Competitive exchange rates; (vi) Trade liberalization-replacement of
quantitative restrictions with low and uniform tariffs; (vii) Openness to foreign direct
investment; (viii) Privatization of state enterprises; (ix) Deregulation; and (x) Legal security
for property rights). Socialist political leaders in Latin America such as Venezuelan
President Hugo Chvez, Cuban President Fidel Castro, Bolivian President Evo Morales, and
Brazilian President Luiz Imicio Lula da Silva are vocal and well-known critics of the
Washington Consensus.
16 See Center for Int'l Trade & Dev., Harvard University, The Washington Consensus,
available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html (last visited Mar.
31, 2007).
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effectiveness, international enforceability 17 and the elimination of biases in
favor or against a local or foreign party as benefits to using arbitration to
settle international disputes-were not sufficient to convince Latin
American countries to abandon the Calvo Doctrine.18 For Latin American
countries, international arbitration came as an external imposition supported
mainly by the international business community and the new economic
order. Latin American countries learned that increasing foreign investment
would require reconsidering their longstanding hostility towards
international arbitration. 19 Suddenly, the concept of legal certainty assumed
overwhelming significance, giving weight to the formation of the contract
as the cornerstone of trading relationships and reinforcing the importance of
methods for dispute resolution.2°
The Washington Consensus and other efforts to encourage alternative
dispute mechanisms in Latin America were motivated in part by the
condition of national judiciary systems. In the 1990s, the judiciaries in
many parts of Latin America experienced a crisis which manifested itself
through lengthy case delays, extensive case backlogs, limited judicial
access by the population, lack of transparency and predictability in court
decisions, and weak public confidence in the judicial system.21 The Inter-
American Bank faulted judiciary systems for their lack of alternative
dispute mechanisms. Other inherent problems were identified such as
lack of independence of the judiciary, inadequate administrative capacity of
the courts, deficient case management, a shortage of judges and lack of
training, noncompetitive personnel practices, expenditure control systems
lacking transparency, inadequate legal training and education, weak
enforcement and reprimand for unethical behavior, and burdensome laws
17 Kenneth T. Ungar, The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under UNCITRAL 's Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 717 (1987).
18 Jane L. Volz & Roger S. Haydock, Foreign Arbitral Awards: Enforcing the Award
Against the Recalcitrant Loser, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 867, 869 (1996). Moreover,
"[a]rbitration also provides a choice of industry experts to resolve disputes. In litigation, the
parties are normally assigned a judge who follows their case from start to finish. Judges
usually have legal training, but not specific industry knowledge." Paul E. Mason, The
Corporate Counsel's View: International Commercial Arbitration, 49 DisP. RESOL. J. 22
(1994).
19 Cremades, Foreign Investment, supra note 10, at 81.
20 See Emilio J. Cardenas, Ambassador to Arg., Address at the 40th Anniversary of the
Convention on the Recogniction and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (June 10,
1998), in ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION,
EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS, UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION No. E.99.V.2 (1998) at 14,
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ texts/arbitration/NY-conv/NYCDay-e.pdf.
21 See Maria Dakolias, The Judicial Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean, World
Bank Technical Paper No. 319 (1996), www.bancomundial.org.br/content/_downloadblob.
php?cod blob=546.
22 See id.
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and procedures.23 To remedy these judicial ills, international organizations
financed judicial reform programs.
1. Energy-Related Investments in Latin America
Latin American countries implemented Washington Consensus
reforms, and nearly every country in Latin America embraced the free
market process. 25 A common perception was that widespread privatizations
occurring in energy-related industries throughout Latin America would lure
foreign investors, and countries that increased investor confidence by
embracing international arbitration would benefit to a greater extent.
At first, foreign direct investment was mainly directed toward
upgrading public utilities and infrastructure, with investment focusing on
telecommunications, water projects, roads and the energy sector. 26 Most of
27this investment was acquired by government-owned companies. Yet,
many governments gradually privatized hydropower plants, thermo power
plants, transmission lines and other electricity and natural gas utilities.28
For instance, Argentina began privatizing its oil sector in 1990 and ended in
1999 with the government sale of the state-owned oil company to Spanish-
owned Repsol. As with the oil sector, the natural gas and electricity
industries have also been deregulated and generation, transmission, and
distribution are now open to the private sector. 29 The Peruvian government
partly privatized the state-owned oil company, Petroperu, in 1993 and the
state-owned electricity company, Electroperu, in the 1990s. 30  Short of
privatization, other countries promoted the creation of independent power
23 See id.
24 Frutos-Peterson, supra note 4.
25 The exception is Cuba. See generally Salacuse, supra note 12, at 884.
26 Nigel Blackaby & Sylvia Noury, International Arbitration in the Mercosur- Is
Harmonisation the Solution?, 9 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 445, 445-46 (2003).
27 See Mark R. Yzaguirre, Project Finance and Privatization: The Bolivian Example, 20
Hous. J. INT'L L. 597, 603-10 (1998); David J. Pascuzzi, International Trade and Foreign
Investment in Colombia: A Sound Economic Policy Amidst Crisis, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 443,
468-69 (1994).
28 See generally Cody Miller, Petroleum Exports from Latin America to the United
States, 10 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 819 (2004).
29 U.S. Energy Info. Admin. [U.S. EIA], Country Analysis Briefs: Argentina,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Argentina/Full.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). See also
Jay G. Martin, Privatization of Latin American Energy, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 103,
105-06 (1999).
30 U.S. EIA, Country Analysis Briefs: Peru, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/peru.html
(last visited Mar. 31, 2007). Colombia has also liberalized the oil sector in order to attract the
investment of foreign oil companies, including the possibility for foreign companies to own
100 percent stakes in oil ventures. For more information, see U.S. EIA, Country Analysis
Briefs: Colombia, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Colombia/Full.html (last visited Mar.
31, 2007).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:591 (2007)
producers 31 or encouraged the construction of new power plants by the
private sector.32
Although many of the oil companies remain fully owned by the
government or partially controlled by the government, the oil and gas
industry received important investments through the granting of new oil
concessions or the execution of service contracts with national oil
companies. In Brazil, where the oil sector is dominated by state-owned
Petrobras,33 legislation passed in 1997 allowed joint ventures between
Petrobras and foreign oil companies.34 The Ecuadorian government
followed a similar path allowing joint ventures with state-owned
Petroecuador. In 2005, Petroecuador's production represented only 38% of
national crude oil output, with the remainder coming from private projects
between the Ecuadorian government and foreign oil producers. 35 Finally,
private investment was introduced in Venezuela in the 1990s through the
use of service contracts in upstream oil industries.
36
Yet, privatization undertaken by Latin American countries would
attract multinational oil and energy corporations, but only to the context of
other national policies. As one investor stated, the world petroleum
industry is globally interdependent,, 37 and international energy companies
considering multiple competing global investment opportunities will
compare their options taking into account inter alia, investment protections,
tax incentives and the level of regulation by the state.38  Given capital
31 See Adilson de Oliveira et al., The IPP Experience in the Brazilian Electricity Market
37 (Program on Energy and Sustainable Dev., Working Paper No. 53, 2005), available at
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20995/Brazil-IPP.pdf. In the electricity sector, while most
generation and transmission is controlled by the government, distribution is mainly in private
hands.
32 As in the case of Mexico. See Martin, supra note 29, at 107.
33 See generally Marilda Rosado de Sd Ribeiro, The New Oil and Gas Industry in Brazil:
An Overview of the Main Legal Aspects, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 141 (2001).
34 U.S. EIA, Country Analysis Briefs: Brazil, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Brazil/
Full.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). This law also created the National Petroleum Agency
("ANP"). According to the Regulation of Petroleum Industry in Brazil, Law No. 9,478
art.8.IV, available at http://www.anp.gov.br/doc/conhecalei dopetroleojingles.pdf (last
visited Mar. 31, 2007), ANP has the responsibility to "elaborate the bidding rounds
announcements and promote the bidding processes for the concession of exploration,
development and production activities, signing the relevant contracts and inspecting their
performance."
35 U.S. EIA, Country Analysis Briefs: Ecuador, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
Ecuador/Full.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
36 U.S. EIA, Country Analysis Briefs: Venezuela, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
Venezuela/Full.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). Under these contracts, foreign companies
operate the fields while PDVSA purchases the crude oil and pays a fee for the services.
37 Thomas W. Waelde, International Energy Investment, 17 ENERGY L.J. 191, 192
(1996).
38 Id. at 192.
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investments in the oil, gas an energy sectors are in the order of millions of
dollars, and that most investors are unwilling to relinquish protection of
multimillion dollar investments to domestic courts, 39 efforts to encourage
alternative dispute resolution would increase investor confidence. 40  The
existence of a framework for resolution of disputes provides a degree of
certainty and protection that investors seek.4  The desire to embrace
arbitration would need to be met with concrete actions to further domestic
reforms and international initiatives.
III. EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
The flow of foreign capital to energy sectors in Latin America
produced an increased internationalization of Latin American economies
and demand for greater investor protection for foreign investment.
Protection was sought not only in substantive rights (fair and equitable
treatment, non discrimination, etc.) but in the availability of international
fora to seek redress or assert claims. To be sure, investors commanding
substantial monetary investments in oil and energy projects would demand
assurances to prevent the host country from altering rules to impair (or at
worst, expropriate) foreign investment once it had been made.42 Most Latin
American countries realized that in order to attract foreign investment, they
would need to embrace arbitration by ratifying international conventions
encouraging international arbitration and amending their domestic
legislation. Over the last fifteen years, Latin American countries have taken
such steps.
A. The ICSID Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
In order to provide investors with assurances that would outlive any
future unilateral changes in the legal framework, most Latin American
countries signed the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States (the "ICSID Convention").
The ICSID Convention was formulated by the Executive Directors of the
World Bank and entered into force in 1966 when it had been ratified by
39 Blackaby & Noury, supra note 26, at 445.
40 Horacio A. Grigera-Na6n, Arbitration in Latin America: Overcoming Traditional
Hostility, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 203, 257 (1991) [hereinafter Grigera-Na6n,
Arbitration].
41 Jonathan Hamilton, Featured Q&A: Latin American Investment Treaties, LATIN
AMERICA ENERGY ADVISOR (Oct. 4, 2006), available at http://www.whitecase.com/
publications_10042006/
42 Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin
America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 301, 316
(2004) (explaining the United States's fear of nationalizations and expropriations like those
that occurred in Mexico and Venezuela in the 1920s and 1970s, respectively).
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twenty countries.43  As of April 2006, 143 countries had ratified the
Convention to become Contracting States."
The ICSID Convention created an international forum to resolve
investment disputes between host states and nationals of another state,45
which has been adopted by nearly all Latin American countries.46 Paraguay
was the first Latin American country to ratify the ICSID Convention
(1983), Guatemala was the last (2003), and there are some countries that
have yet to ratify it (e.g., Brazil, Haiti, Cuba, Dominican Republic, and
Mexico).47 Among other benefits, the ICSID Convention allows countries
to provide their consent in advance to submit disputes with investors of the
other contracting party to international arbitration before the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID Centre"), other
institutions, or even under the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules.48 The ICSID Convention
and the jurisdiction of the tribunal established under it (the ICSID Centre)
were conceived as a system of adjudication of legal disputes arisinj directly
out of an investment, a premise articulated in Article 25(1). 9 This
definition excludes two kinds of disputes. First, it excludes non-legal
questions, and second, it excludes disputes not arising directly from the
investment concerned, i.e., general economic legislation not directly
impacting the investor involved. 50  Although recourse to ICSID Centre
conciliation and arbitration is entirely voluntary, once the parties have
consented to arbitration under the ICSID Convention, neither can
unilaterally withdraw consent 51 and awards are not only recognized, but
enforced.5
43 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, Introduction, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 4 I.L.M.
524, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/intro.htn [hereinafter ICSID
Convention].
44 See id.
45 Anoosha Boralessa, Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom of ICSID
Awards Against the Republic of Argentina: Obstacles that Transnational Corporations May
Face, 17 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 53, 53-65 (2004).
46 See infra APPENDIX I for a list of Latin American countries that have ratified the
ICSID Convention.
41 See id.
48 Jason Webb Yackee, Are BITs Such a Bright Idea? Exploring the Ideational Basis of
Investment Treaty Enthusiasm, 12 U.C. DAvIs J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 195, 221 (2005).
49 See ICSID Convention, supra note 43, art. 25.
50 See Ileana M. Blanco, Lessons Learned from ICSID Arbitration over Investment
Disputes Involving Argentina's Privatization Program and Economic Emergency Law No.
25561, http://www.bracewellgiuliani.com/files/tbl_sI 6Publications%5CFileUpload77%
5C1 173%5CPRESENTATIONTOIAPG.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
51 See ICSID Convention, supra note 43, art. 25.
52 See id. arts. 53-54.
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To encourage and protect the investment of their own nationals in the
territory of the other party, many treaties being signed by Latin American
countries with capital-exporting countries 53 contain arbitration provisions
similar, if not identical, to those found in the ICSID Convention. Latin
American states are now parties to at least 300 treaties with investment
protection provisions that contain arbitration clauses. 54  Regional trade
agreements strive to decrease trade barriers in several areas, and usually
contain unique investment provisions which provide for international
arbitration as a means of resolving trade disputes.55 Arbitration under the
auspices of ICSID is similarly one of the main mechanisms for the
settlement of investment disputes under four recent multilateral trade and
investment treaties56: the North American Free Trade Agreement, 57 the
Energy Charter Treaty, 58 the Cartagena Free Trade Agreement 59 and the
Colonia Investment Protocol of Mercosur.60 Latin American countries also
concluded multilateral free trade agreements and treaties of economic
integration such as the Andean Community,6 ' Central American Common
62 63Market,6 2 and numerous other free trade agreements.
53 Rafil Emilio Vinuesa, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Settlement of Investment
Disputes under ICSID: The Latin American Experience, 8 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 501, 504-05
(2002).
54 See Hamilton, supra note 41.
55 See, e.g., Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade
Agreement, May 28, 2004,43 I.L.M. 514 [hereinafter CAFTA].
56 See ICSID Convention, supra note 43.
57 Agreement on North American Free Trade, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
58 Energy Charter Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 373, available
at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user.upload/document/EN.pdf. The Energy Charter
Treaty was originally based on integrating the energy sectors of the former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War into the broader European and world markets.
59 The Cartagena Free Trade Agreement is between the United States, Colombia, Peru,
Ecuador and Bolivia.
60 Protocol of Colonia for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments in
Mercosur [hereinafter Colonia Protocol], Jan. 17, 1994, Mercosur/CMC / Dec. No. 11/93.
Mercosur references the Mercado Comith del Sur ("Southern Common Market"), established
by a treaty on economic integration entered into among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay. Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter
Treaty of Asunci6n], amended by Protocol of Ouro Preto, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1248
(1995).
61 Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910.
Originally formulated between Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru, Chile has since
left and Venezuela has joined and subsequently withdrawn itself from the Agreement. An
updated version is available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/
andetrie l.htm.
62 General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960, 455
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.sice.org/trade/camertoc.asp.
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Other types of treaties focus exclusively on investment and are also
likely to incorporate ICSID arbitration rules. Investment treaties began to
proliferate after World War II when capital-exporting nations sought to
create an international law of investment. Customar7 international law had
proven inadequate to protect foreign investments. Bilateral investment
treaties ("BITs") began to emerge in the late 1950s when West Germany
concluded the first BIT with Pakistan.65 Latin American countries, with
some exceptions, began negotiating these agreements in the 1990S.
66
Today, every Latin American country, including Cuba, has at least one BIT
in force.67  For instance, Argentina is a party to fifty-three BITs; Peru,
twent-six; Chile, thirty-six; Venezuela, twenty-one; and Ecuador, twenty-
one. 6  BITs generally provide similar substantive protections to other
treaties, such as fair and equitable treatment, non-discrimination, most
favorable nation and national treatment, and the prohibition of direct or
indirect expropriation without prompt, adequate and effective
compensation. 69  BITs also address and define the scope of application
(including the definition of protected investment and nationality).7 °
63 Among others, the following free trade agreements have been executed: Bolivia-
Mexico, Canada-Chile, Canada-Costa Rica, Central America-Chile, Central America-
Dominican Republic-U.S. (CAFTA), Central America-Dominican Republic, Central
America-Panama, Chile-European Union, Chile-Korea, Chile-Mexico, Chile-United States,
Costa Rica-Mexico, Group of Three (Colombia-Mexico-Venezuela), Mexico-European
Community, Mexico-Israel, Mexico-Japan, Mexico-Nicaragua, Mexico-Northern Triangle
(El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras), Panama-Taiwan and Peru-Thailand. See WTO
Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, Facts and Figures, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/region -e/region e.htm#facts (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
64 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 71 (2005).
65 Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-Pak., Nov. 25, 1959,
457 U.N.T.S. 23. The West Germany-Pakistan BIT entered into force on April 28, 1962.
66 Costa Rica executed a BIT with Switzerland on September 1, 1965, which entered into
force on August 18, 1966. Acuerdo entre la Repfilblica de Costa Rica y la Confederaci6n
Suiza para la Protecci6n y Promoci6n de Inversiones [Agreement between Costa Rica and
Switzerland for the Protection and Promotion of Investments], Sept. 1, 1965, updated on
Aug. 1, 2000, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/costarica switzerland-sp.pdf.
Others, including Bolivia and Costa Rica executed BITs in the 1980s. See UNCTAD.org
Country-specific Lists of BITs, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=
2344&lang=l (select a country to download a list of its BITs, with signature dates).
67 See infra APPENDIX I for a list of Latin American countries that have signed and
ratified BITs.
68 See Hamilton, supra note 41.
69 Vinuesa, supra note 53, at 506. See also Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 64, at 79-90.
70 Guido Santiago Tawil, The Role of Arbitration and International, Regional,
Subregional and Bilateral Treaties in Latin America, THE BOMCHIL GROUP NEWSL. (The
Bomchil Group, Buenos Aires, Arg.), Dec. 2002, available at http://www.bomchilgroup.org/
argdec02.html.
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Notably, these bilateral treaties incorporate ICSID arbitration rules.7'
The first adoption of the ICSID Convention by Latin American
countries in 1983 represented a shift in public sentiment towards arbitration.
For over a century, most Latin American countries had rejected the
possibility of resolving their disputes with foreign nationals before an
international tribunal. From the adoption of the ICSID Convention to the
ratification of treaties incorporating ICSID rules, investors gained
confidence in their ability to settle disputes, and particularly energy
disputes, using international arbitration.
B. International Rules Governing the Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements and Awards
In addition to the ICSID Convention, Latin American countries
searched for other international mechanisms to signal their commitment to
international arbitration. Measures that would ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements and awards were paramount. For, although the
majority of the arbitral awards are carried out voluntarily, the
effectiveness of international arbitration vis-6-vis national litigation is
measured in terms of successful enforcement. Specific to arbitration, this
represents the existence of binding procedures to recognize and enforce
awards internationally (i.e., having the possibility of enforcing the award
not only in the place where the arbitration took place but in any country
where the losing party may have assets).73
With enforcement as a key concern among international investors,
most Latin American countries decided to follow the steps of other
developing and developed countries and ratify two instruments governing
the enforcement of arbitration awards-the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (the
"New York Convention"), 74 and the Panama Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration of 1975 (the "Panama
Convention").75 The acceptance of foreign adjudication also included the
ratification of the Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of
71 Yackee, supra note 48, at 221.
72 ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES,
LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 511 (4th ed. 2004).
73 Id. at 27 (explaining that one of the principal reasons of choosing international
arbitration is the international enforceability of the awards since international conventions
that govern recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards have been accepted by a majority
of states. Conversely, there are very few treaties on reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments).
14 See infra APPENDIX I for a list of Latin American countries that have signed and
ratified the New York Convention.
75 Frank E. Nattier, International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America: Enforcement
ofArbitral Agreements and Awards, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 397, 402 (1986).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:591 (2007)
Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards of 1979 (the "Montevideo
Convention"),76  the consent to arbitration under the Convention
Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (the "MIGA
Convention"),77 and investment agreements executed with the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).78  With respect to international
conventions, all Latin American countries have ratified either or both the
Panama Convention and the New York Convention facilitating the
recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and foreign arbitral
awards in their territories.
79
The New York Convention is the "cornerstone of current international
commercial arbitration"80 and has gained extraordinary acceptance within
the international community. For Latin America, the New York
Convention is more than an advantage-it is an essential tool for competing
in the increasingly liberalized environment of international trade between
private individuals. 8' As of April 2007, 142 countries, and all Latin
American countries, have ratified the New York Convention.82
The primary purpose of the New York Convention is to limit the
grounds under which national courts can refuse to recognize and enforce
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. Recognition should not be
76 Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and
Arbitral Awards, May 8, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1224 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. The
Montevideo Convention is the most recent regional convention relating to arbitration. It
provides for enforcement procedures for judgments and arbitral awards in civil, commercial
and labor proceedings in the contracting states. According to the Organization of American
States (OAS), as of May 2006, the Montevideo Convention has been ratified by the
following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Organization of American States ("Montevideo Convention
Signatories"), http://www.oas.org/juridico/ english/sigs/b-41.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2007).
77 Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11, 1985,
24 I.L.M. 1605 [hereinafter MIGA Convention]. As of October 2005, the following Latin
American countries were members of the MIGA Convention: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. World Bank Group,
("MIGA Member Countries), http://www.miga.org/sitelevel2/level2.cfmn?id=l 152 (last
visited Mar. 31, 2007).
78 OPIC has executed Investment Incentive Agreements with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. OPIC Home Page,
http://www.opic.gov (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
" See APPENDIX I.
80 Volz & Haydock, supra note 18, at 877 (citing ALBERT J. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW
YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 1 (1981)).
81 See Cardenas, supra note 20, at 15.
82 UNCITRAL Texts and Status, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/
arbitration/NYConventionstatus.html (last visited May 18, 2007).
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confused with enforcement, however. An award may be recognized but not
necessarily enforced.83 Recognition deals with the resjudicata effect given
to a valid and binding award. As one commentator writes, "the purpose of
recognition on its own is generally to act as a shield, 85 in order to block
any subsequent attempt by one of the parties to the arbitration to re-litigate
the matter before a court.
86
Enforcement entails not only the recognition of the award but also the
request to the competent authority to apply the legal sanctions "to compel
the party against whom the award was made to carry it out."' 87 As far as the
enforcement of the arbitration agreement is concerned, the New York
Convention establishes that, when dealing with a matter that the parties
have agreed to submit to arbitration, the courts of a contracting state must
"refer the parties to arbitration, unless they find that the said agreement is
null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed., 88 In contrast,
with respect to enforcement of arbitral awards, the New York Convention
provides that contracting states "shall recognize arbitral awards as binding
and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory
where the award is relied upon," 89 under certain conditions specified in the
Convention.
The New York Convention makes clear that enforcement of an arbitral
award can be refused only if the party against whom the award is being
enforced submits proof of any of the following five grounds: (i)
incapacity; 90 (ii) lack of notice of the appointment of the tribunal or the
proceedings, or inability to present a case; 1 (iii) lack of jurisdiction by the
tribunal or a tribunal that acted in excess of the conferred jurisdiction; 9 (iv)
any procedural irregularity;93 or (v) the non-binding nature of the award or
the fact that it was set aside or suspended. 94 Moreover, the New York
Convention allows the competent authority to refuse the enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award if the subject matter of the dispute cannot be settled
by arbitration under the laws of that country95 or if the award is contrary to
83 REDFERN ET AL., supra note 72, at 516.
84 Ungar, supra note 17, at 723.
85 REDFERN ET AL., supra note 72, at 516.
86 Ungar, supra note 17, at 723.
87 REDFERN ET AL., supra note 72, at 517.
88 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. II,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
89 Id. art. III.
90 Id. art. V. 1 (a).
91 Id. art. V.I(b).
92 Id. art. V. 1 (c).
93 Id. art. V. 1 (d).
94 New York Convention, supra note 88, art. V.I(e).
9' Id. art. V.2(a).
605
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public policy.
96
The Panama Convention was modeled after the New York
Convention97 and reproduces similar language regarding grounds for
refusal. The only notable difference is that the Panama Convention provides
that "[i]n the absence of an express agreement between the parties, the
arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure of
the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission. No similar
provision was included in the New York Convention. Another feature of the
Panama Convention is the validation of arbitration agreements so long as
they are "set forth in an instrument signed by the parties, or in the form of
an exchange of letters, telegrams, or telex communications," 99 making this
provision broader than that of the New York Convention. 00
C. Domestic Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law
Given current global acceptance of the New York Convention, one
would hardly believe the initial reluctance to adopt it. In the 1980s, the
UNCITRAL Working Group found that constitutional restrictions or other
reasons may have prevented countries from ratifying the New York
Convention. 10' Furthermore, inconsistencies in national laws were leading
to different interpretations of the Convention in similar enforcement
actions. 102 The problems encountered were not sufficiently grave to amend
the New York Convention however, and UNCITRAL concluded that those
inconsistencies could be addressed through changes in the national laws.
According to UNCITRAL, the adoption of a model law would not
only reduce interpretative difficulties with the New York Convention but
would also help modernize and increase uniformity of the arbitration laws
of many countries based on well-established principles.'0 3  In 1985,
UNCITRAL formulated a Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration ("Model Law"), thereby codifying a set of model legislative
provisions that states could adopt by enacting into national law. The
General Assembly of the United Nations recommended that all States
consider the Model Law in view of the desirability of uniformity of the law
of arbitral procedures and the specific needs of international commercial
96 Id. art. V.2(b).
97 Volz & Haydock, supra note 18, at 884.
98 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration art. 3, Jan. 30,
1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Panama Convention].
9' Id. art. 1.
100 Bishop, supra note 9, at 73.
0' UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL REPORT: EXCERPTS ON THE MODEL LAW, reprinted in 24
I.L.M. 1302, 1364 (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Report].
102 Ungar, supra note 17, at 727.
103 Id. at 728.
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arbitration practice. 104 Many Latin American countries ratified it soon
thereafter.
Some countries find it easier to adopt the provisions on recognition
and enforcement as part of the Model Law than to ratify the New York
Convention.10 5 However, in many ways, the Model Law provisions
regarding recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards'0 6 are nearly
identical to those in the New York Convention. 10 7 No provision allows a
review of the award on the merits and the grounds for refusal are exhaustive
(i.e., no other grounds may be invoked to deny recognition and/or
enforcement). Model Law provisions recognize common principles such as
separability, direct enforceability of the arbitration agreement, the
kompetenz-kompetenz principle in which the arbitrator is qualified to decide
on his/her own competence, and the autonomy of the parties. Some
regulate the procedure in such detail that it gives very little flexibility to the
arbitrators. 0 8 The Model Law, following the trend of the New York
Convention, shifts the burden of proof to the party seeking refusal, clearly
stating that recognition and enforcement may be refused "at the request of
the party against whom it is invoked, if that party furnishes to the
competent court" the necessary proof to support the grounds relied upon.'0 9
Lastly, even if the enforcing court finds that some of the grounds for refusal
have merit it is not obliged to deny recognition or enforcement; it is only
authorized to do so." 0 The text of the Model Law is clear in this respect,
stating that "recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award... may be
refused""' (emphasis added). The wording of the New York Convention is
nearly identical." 2  The Model Law, by including an enforcement
mechanism almost identical to that of the New York Convention, aimed to
provide a uniform treatment of all awards irrespective of their country of
origin.
Latin American countries began to recognize the use of international
arbitration as a means of dispute settlement" 3 by adopting many, if not all,
'4 G.A. Res. 40/72 (1985), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/
a40r072.htm (last visited May 18, 2007).
105 UNCITRAL Report, supra note 101, at 1314.
106 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to
Enactment and Use, arts. 35-36 (1985) [hereinafter Model Law].
107 New York Convention, supra note 88, art. V.
108 Frutos-Peterson, supra note 4 (referring to some problems encountered under the
arbitration laws of Costa Rica, Bolivia and Venezuela).
109 Model Law, supra note 106, art. 36.
110 REDFERN ET AL., supra note 72, at 528.
111 Model Law, supra note 106, art. 36.
112 New York Convention, supra note 88, art. V. 1.
113 See, for example, article 16 of Peru's Foreign Investment Law, Decree-Law 662 of
1991, which provides that "[tihe State may submit controversies derived from legal stability
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Model Law provisions into their own law. 1 4 Model Law provisions have
been adopted in Chile,'15 Guatemala, 1 6 Mexico," 7 Paraguay" 8 and Peru." 9
Short of adopting the Model Law, other countries adopted new legislation
incorporating its basic principles. 2
0 Countries such as Brazil,' 21 Bolivia,
22
Colombia,' 21 Costa Rica,1 4 Ecuador,
25 El Salvador, 26 Honduras, 12 7
Panama,128 and Venezuela' 29 modernized their arbitration laws, taking some
or most of the principles embodied in the Model Law and adapting them to
their needs.
IV. THE PROLIFERATION OF ICSID FILINGS AGAINST LATIN
AMERICAN COUNTRIES
Latin American countries enacted national laws and international
conventions to attract foreign direct investment and unsurprisingly, the
number of ICSID filings rose, but gradually. For U.S. and foreign
agreements to arbitral tribunal established by virtue of international agreements entered into
by Peru"; article 15 of El Salvador's Investment Law, Decree No. 732 of 1999, which
provides in pertinent part that "[i]n case controversies arising between foreign investors and
the Government, regarding their investments in El Salvador, the investors may remit the
controversy to... [ICSID]".
114 See infra APPENDIX I for a list of the countries that have adopted the UNCITRAL
Model Law.
15 International Commercial Arbitration Law, Law No. 19,971, Sept. 29, 2004 (Chile).
116 Arbitration Law, Decree No. 67-95, Nov. 16, 1995 (Guat.).
117 Decree of July 22, 1993, which amended Title Four-Commercial Arbitration-of the
Commercial Code (Mex.).
118 Arbitration and Mediation Law, Law 1879/02, Apr. 24, 2002 (Para.).
119 General Arbitration Law, No. 26,572, Jan. 3, 1996 (Peru).
120 Bishop, supra note 9, at 65.
121 Arbitration Law, No. 9,307, Sept. 23, 1996 (Braz.).
122 Arbitration and Conciliation Law, No. 1770, Mar. 10, 1997 (Bol.). See Ramiro
Moreno-Baldivieso, Medios Alternativos de Solucidn de Controversias, in REVISTA
IBEROAMERICANA DE ARBITRAJE Y MEDIACION, Aug. 3, 2005,
http://www.servilex.com.pe/arbitraje/colaboraciones/conferencia-acj2.html (explaining that
Bolivia's new law was based on the UNCITRAL Model Law and adapted to the domestic
reality) (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).
123 Statute of Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, Decree No. 1818, Sept. 7,
1998 (Colom.).
124 Alternative Dispute Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace, Law No. 7727, Dec. 9,
1997 (Costa Rica).
125 Law on Arbitration and Mediation, Official Register 145, Sept. 4, 1997 (Ecuador).
126 Decree No. 914, enacted July 2002, approving the Law on Mediation, Conciliation
and Arbitration (El Sal.).
127 Arbitration and Conciliation Law, Decree No. 161-2000, Oct. 17, 2000 (Hond.).
128 Decree Law No. 5 of July 8, 1999, which establishes the general regime for
arbitration, conciliation and mediation (Pan.).
129 General Commercial Arbitration Law, Apr. 7, 1998 (Venez.).
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companies, ICSID jurisdiction offers the dual benefits of providing a forum
for companies to pursue investment claims against a host country and
providing enforceability of awards under the New York Convention.'3"
Yet, although the ICSID Convention entered into force in 1966, it was not
until 1972 when the first case was filed with the Centre 13 and even through
the 1980s few cases were submitted to the Centre. 32 This is mainly
because consent to ICSID jurisdiction was given in investment contracts
(contracts between governments of member countries and investors from
other member countries) or similar instruments and few of those contracts
were in existence at the time, particularly with Latin American countries.
33
Since 1980, however, governments are increasingly granting advance
consent to submit investment disputes to ICSID arbitration in investment
treaties, especially in BITs.
13 4
The first case brought against a Latin American country under the
ICSID occurred in 1996, six years after Latin American countries began
negotiating BITs.135 Since 1996, the number of ICSID cases brought against
Latin American countries has escalated in general, and particularly in the
energy sector. As of April 2006, there were 104 concluded cases and 103
pending cases within the ICSID. Out of the 104 concluded cases, only
twenty-one cases were filed against Latin American countries (fifteen of
which were filed since 1998).. However, a larger fraction of cases are
pending against Latin American countries. Fifty-seven of the 103 were
filed against Latin American countries.' 37  Of the fifty-seven, thirty-five
were filed against Argentina alone and can be explained by the Argentine
financial crisis of 2001.138 The remaining arbitrations could be explained
by the liberalization of Latin American economies and the increased
protections granted by BITs, which have resulted in an increase in foreign
130 See Blanco, supra note 50.
131 Holiday Inns S.A. and Others v. Morocco (ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1). See Pierre
Lalive, The First World Bank Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco) - Some Legal
Problems, 50 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 123 (1980).
132 ICSID Cases: Introduction, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm (last
visited Mar. 31, 2007).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Compaiia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica (ICSID Case
No. ARB/96/1). Yet Costa Rica's consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre was given ad-hoc
and not established under a BIT.
136 See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
conclude.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). See infra APPENDIX II for a more detailed
description of the cases brought against Latin American countries before ICSID.
137 Id.
138 Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar & Jon Schmid, The Rise of International Investment
Arbitration in Latin America, 4 LATIN AM. L. & Bus. REp. (Dec. 2004).
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investment, which in turn fueled the potential for arbitration claims.1
39
A. Energy-Related ICSID Filings
The remarkable growth of energy-related investment in Latin America
has kindled growth in the number of ICSID filings concerning energy-
related disputes. According to Table 2 in the Appendix, as of April, 2006,
forty percent (thirty-one out of seventy-eight) of the ICSID cases that are
concluded and pending against Latin American countries are energy-
related. Most of the energy related disputes are filed against Argentina,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Perhaps not coincidentally, Argentina is the
country with the most BITs in place, followed by Chile, Cuba and Peru.
The Argentine case is one worth discussion. Argentina signed the ICSID
Convention on May 21, 1991 and ratified it on October 19, 1994. To date,
Argentina has been grappling with nearly thirty claims from foreign-owned
companies in the ICSID. In every case it has challenged ICSID
jurisdiction. The bulk of the complaints are from utilities due to the
government's 2002 decision to convert rates into devalued pesos and freeze
them.140 Companies with claims against Argentina include: LG&E Energy
Corp., Enron Corporation, CMS Gas Transmission Company, Camuzzi
International, S.A., AES Corporation, El Paso Energy International
Company, Enersis, S.A., Pan American Energy LLC, and others.
141
V. THE DIFFICULTY OF DEVELOPING A CULTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA
One cannot measure in definite terms the extent to which adoption of
the ICSID and New York Conventions has contributed to an increase in
foreign direct investment in Latin America, or even if it has brought a level
of uniform standards for the enforcement of arbitral awards in national
courts. 142 We do have evidence, however, that while most Latin American
countries adopted national rules and international conventions to recognize
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, there is no deeply-engrained
business arbitration culture in Latin America. 143 While the practice of
arbitration has advanced in some Latin American countries, as evidenced at
139 Id.
140 See Blanco, supra note 50.
141 id.
142 Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards Under the ICSID and New
York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 175 (1996) (arguing that the conventions
have not been entirely successful in achieving their goal of uniform enforcement of arbitral
awards).
143 Horacio A. Grigera-Na6n, Recent Trends Regarding Commercial Arbitration in Latin
America, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 3,
at 109.
610
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a minimum by the proliferation of arbitration centers, many factors have
delayed this process. This section draws upon examples in three areas
which have slowed the development of international arbitration in Latin
America: (1) laws are sometimes insufficient to support international
arbitration, (2) judicial decisions continue to impede efficient and flexible
arbitration in Latin America, 144 and (3) although many of these decisions
are overturned on appeal, the lack of certainty and speed reduces the
willingness of parties to submit their disputes to arbitration.
Drawing from experiences of a select group of Latin American
countries, the following paragraphs provide examples of the types of
difficulties these countries face in enforcing arbitration agreements and
awards. In most of the countries noted international arbitration laws have
been passed and international treaties providing for respect for international
arbitration clauses and enforcement of awards have been ratified.
A. Role of Legislation
While most countries have adopted the Model Law, rules are often
insufficient to support international arbitration. Similarly, rules governing
international arbitration may be too new for their success to have been
assessed.
1. Select Country Examples of Lack of Legislation
Argentina and Chile are examples of countries that have enacted
domestic legislation in support of international arbitration whose legislation
is either insufficient to further a culture of international arbitration or too
nascent to have made a measurable impact.
The main difficulty in enforcing arbitration agreements in Argentina is
that under Argentine law, the arbitration agreement or arbitration clause is
not operative.145 The Argentine Procedural Code requires that once a
dispute arises the parties execute a submission agreement or compromiso
146
in which the parties agree to submit the dispute to arbitration and specify,
inter alia, the name of the arbitrators, the matters to be settled by arbitration
and the events or circumstances causing the controversy. 147  Similar to
Argentina, Uruguay's law requires the parties in an arbitration proceeding
to execute a submission agreement or compromise.
148
144 Horacio Grigera-Na6n, Lecture, International Arbitration in Latin America (Special
Section Seminar Proceeding), 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 219, 222-23 (1995).
145 REDFERN ET AL., supra note 72, at 162.
146 Blackaby & Noury, supra note 26, at 460.
147 Grigera-Na6n, Arbitration, supra note 40, at 225. See generally, Osvaldo Marzoratti,
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement in Latin America: Argentina, in ENFORCEMENT OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 9, 15.
148 Blackaby & Noury, supra note 26, at 466; Daniel M. Ferrere, Enforcement of
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Notwithstanding this legal limitation, Argentine courts have attempted
to overcome the problems created by the lack of legislation supporting
arbitration. 149  In an international arbitration seated in Buenos Aires, the
Commercial Court of Appeals of the City of Buenos Aires acknowledged
that certain provisions of the Procedural Code were "relatively inadequate
to govern international arbitration proceedings."150  The court in this case
based its decision on the internationally recognized principles and
provisions of the Model Law and not upon Argentine Procedural Code. It
further stated that while national courts retain powers to oversee the
arbitration proceedings, in the case of international arbitrations, these
powers should be exercised with utmost care.15 ' Since then, the majority of
judicial decisions have followed this trend; 152 some courts, including the
Supreme Court, have decided against those internationally recognized
principles. 153
Chile has also been a leader in the process of privatization and
implementation of free market reforms, becoming the most dynamic and
Arbitration Agreements in Uruguay, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN
LATIN AMERICA, supra note, 3 at 81-82.
149 Alessandro Spinillo & Emilio Vogelius, Argentina, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
IN LATIN AMERICA 17, 22 (Nigel Blackaby et al. eds., 2002).
150 Camara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial de la Capital Federal [CNCom.]
[Commercial Court of Appeals of the City of Buenos Aires], Section E, 09/26/1989,
"Welbers S.A., Enrique C. v. Extraktionstechnik Gesellschaft fiir Anlagenbau M.B.M.," Le
Ley [L.L.] (1989-E-730) (Arg.), translated by Spinillo & Vogelius, supra note 149, at 38-39
n.71.
151 Spinillo & Vogelius, supra note 149, at 28.
152 See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 04/05/2005, "Bear Service S.A v.
Cerveceria Modelo S.A.," (Arg.), available at http://www.csjn.gov.ar (confirming the
decision of the Court of Appeals in declaring the incompetence of the Argentine courts to
entertain the case because the parties had validly agreed to submit their disputes to ICC
arbitration in Mexico despite the fact that the petitioner had filed for bankruptcy (concurso
preventivo) before the national courts); Commercial Court of Appeals of the City of Buenos
Aires, Section D, 11/22/2004, "Stubrin, Max v. Inversiones Morice S.A.," available at
http://www.csjn.gov.ar (rejecting the request to nullify the arbitral award for not having
complied with the mandatory pre-judicial mediation imposed by Argentine procedural law
even though the arbitration was governed by Argentine law).
153 Blackaby & Noury, supra note 26, at 460-61 & n.53. E.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia
[CSJN], 06/01/2004, "Jose Cartellone Construcciones Civiles S.A. v. Hidronor S.A.,"
available at http://www.csjn.gov.ar (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) (declaring the partial nullity
of an arbitral award based on the grounds that arbitral awards may be subject to challenge
before the courts when they are illegal, unreasonable or unconstitutional and even if the
parties had agreed that the award would be final and not subject to any appeal); Corte
Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 11/10/1988, "Nidera Argentina v. Rodriguez Alvarez de
Canale," La Ley [L.L.] (1 990-A-419) (Arg.), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/
arbitration/arb/caselaw/courtdecisions/Other/Argentina/ (holding that the validity of the
arbitration agreement has to be decided by the courts once the validity of the entire contract
is in question).
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competitive economy in Latin America. 54 As such, Chile was one of the
first Latin American countries to ratify both the New York and Panama
Conventions.155 Chile is also a party to the ICSID Convention and has
entered into free trade agreements with Mexico, the United States and
Canada. It has signed more than 50 BITs and ratified more than 30.156 In
short, Chile has exhibited a modem approach embracing international
arbitration. 57 Chile "ranks as one of the Latin American countries with the
strongest arbitration traditions, and arbitration is generally seen as the
preferred method of commercial dispute resolution . . . . As such,
arbitration clauses are found in complex commercial instruments as well as
documents such as sales of residential properties and credit agreements.
Until recently, the regulation of international arbitration was governed
by antiquated arbitration legislation. The Code of Civil Procedure and the
Judiciary Code contain specific provisions applicable to arbitration, but this
does not prevent the parties from establishing their own rules. 5 9 The
Chilean Congress enacted a new law on International Commercial
Arbitration based on the Model Law in 2004.160 Legislation was aimed at
facilitating the use of international arbitration and used to create a seat for
domestic companies to settle international disputes. To illustrate, the
presidential message preceding the bill introducing Chile's Arbitration Law
referred to the high costs facing Chilean companies when litigating abroad
and how its approval would foster the holding of international commercial
arbitration in Chile.16 1 To be sure, the delay in adopting a modem
arbitration law may explain why Chile has not been the seat of many
international arbitrations.162  Now that Chile has complied with all the
154 Carlos Eugenio Jorquiera & Karin Helmlinger, Chile, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 149, at 89.
"' See APPENDIX I.
156 Id. See also, Arturo Alessandri, The Arbitration Agreement in Chile, in
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 29. For
updated information about the treaties ratified by Chile, see APPENDIX 1.
157 Blackaby & Noury, supra note 26, at 467.
158 Andres Jana & Angie Armer Rios, Chile: Legislation Regarding Arbitration, GLOBAL
ARBITRATION REVIEW (2007), available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/ara/
09_chile.cfm.
159 Id.
160 Id. (noting the introduction of Chile's International Arbitration Law, Law No. 19.971
on International Commercial Arbitration). For a discussion of the law, see Gonzalo Biggs,
Breakthrough for International Commercial Arbitration in Chile, DIsP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr.
2004, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3923/is_200402/ ain9392190.




162 Id. (stating that in the last years Chile has been the seat of only one ICC arbitration; in
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necessary steps in the modernization of international arbitration, it is
expected that it will become an attractive seat for Latin American
international arbitration disputes. 1
63
B. Role of Judiciary
Even when the Model Law has been adopted in part or in full, the
judiciary is partially to blame for the slow adoption of arbitration because it
has failed to apply the new legislation in accordance with its intended
purpose and policy set forth by the legislator (i.e., favoring commercial
arbitration as a means of dispute settlement).' 64 Other times, the legislation
is applied, but inconsistently. In either case, justification for these actions
can be found in the pervasive sentiment of suspicion towards arbitration and
a lack of experience in arbitration.
Where arbitration is relatively new, there is a sense that arbitration is a
process "in which secret tribunals undermine national sovereignty and
legitimate governmental regulations. 1 65  Local practitioners remain
suspicious of the benefits of arbitration and continue to rely on the
formalistic approaches of litigation, recommending to their clients that they
follow judicial proceedings instead of arbitration, even if the parties have
agreed to submit the disputes to arbitration.' 66 Undeniably, factors such as
judicial corruption and lack of judicial independence from political
interference also may play a role in perpetuating resistance to arbitration.
However, suspicion is also due to the strong influence of the continental
law tradition in Latin America, especially in the area of procedural law and
judicial practice. 167 Procedural law requires that certain formalities must be
followed, not allowing the parties to freely agree on how the proceedings
will be conducted. These formal requirements are an essential part of the
judicial process and deviating from them can nullify proceedings. 168 For
instance, restrictions remain in place limiting the representation of clients
by foreigners and to the language of proceedings. 169 Arbitration is viewed
with suspicion because it is essentially non-formalistic and flexible,
allowing the proceeding to accommodate the parties according to their
particular needs. 
70
Given their discomfort with arbitration, lawyers and judges find no
turn, Argentina has been the seat of eighteen).
163 Jana & Rios, supra note 158.
'64 Id. at 223.
165 See Blanco, supra note 50.
166 Frutos-Peterson, supra note 4, at IV.A.
167 Tawil, supra note 70, at 1.
168 Id.
169 Frutos-Peterson, supra note 4, at IV.A.
170 REDFERN ET AL., supra note 72, at 1.
Energy Disputes in Latin America
27:591 (2007)
reason to invest time and money in training themselves in this area of
practice.'17  Lack of arbitration experience is pervasive in Latin America,
and lawyers and judges tenaciously retain their traditional way of settling
disputes, that is, before the local courts and under well known local rules.
Due to a lack of understanding of the way rules of international arbitration
work, courts have been incapable of distinguishing the particularities of
international disputes vis-i-vis local litigation. 172  Moreover, as there is
usually no limit as to the filing of appeals, lawyers often carry their
challenges up to the Supreme Court with the result being that appeals may
take many years to resolve.
173
1. Select Country Examples of Court Intervention in International
Arbitration
The following country examples examine the extent to which the
judiciary applies arbitration legislation in accordance with its intended
purpose set by the legislator and highlights instances of inconsistent
application of the law. Examples are drawn from Uruguay, Brazil,
Colombia, Panama and Peru.
The Uruguayan arbitration procedure is overregulated and closely
supervised by the local courts. 174 Until the late 1980s, courts in Uruguay
strictly applied the disposition of its Civil Code that forbade the parties to
contract out of the judicial jurisdiction established by the same Code.
175
While Uruguay had ratified both the New York and Panama Conventions,
courts often ruled against the submission of disputes to international
arbitration when, under the Civil Code, those disputes could be settled by
the judiciary in Uruguay. While this parochial position appears to have
been abandoned after a 1992 Court of Appeals decision upheld the validity
of those agreements to arbitrate, 176 the lack of a modern legislation and
inconsistent decisions regarding issues such as the validity of choice of law
clauses in contracts providing for international arbitration incited
skepticism concerning Uruguayan commitment to arbitration.
177
Brazil ratified the New York Convention in 2002 after its Supreme
171 Guido Santiago Tawil, Arbitration in Latin America: Current Trends and Recent
Developments, (Mar. 2003) [hereinafter Tawil, Current Trends], available at
http://www.bomchil.com/cas/articulos/Arbitration%20in%20Latin%20America.pdf.
172 See Cremades, Commercial Arbitration, supra note 3, at 6. See also infra some of the
decisions adopted by the courts of Argentina, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela.
173 Tawil, Current Trends, supra note 171, at 2.
174 Blackaby & Noury, supra note 26, at 466; Daniel M. Ferrere, Enforcement of
Arbitration Agreements in Uruguay, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN
LATIN AMERICA, supra note, 3, at 81-82.
175 Ferrere, supra note 174, at 83-84.
176 Id. at 83-84.
177 Id. at 85.
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Court upheld the constitutionality of its 1996 Arbitration Law. 78 Brazil has
not yet ratified any BIT or any other investment treaty providing for
international arbitration except for regional agreements relating to
Mercosur. 179 However, given the size and importance of its economy, as
well as favorable tax incentives in place, Brazil has been one of the
principal recipients of foreign investment in Latin America. Brazil's
Arbitration Law limits court intervention, yet national courts still retain
substantial powers with respect to the enforcement of the arbitration
agreement, the challenge of the arbitral award and the recognition and
enforcement of the award. Therefore, the support of the Brazilian courts is
pivotal not only for achieving the goals set forth in the new Arbitration
Law, but also for the development and promotion of arbitration in
general. 1
80
As with the majority of Latin American states, Colombia initiated the
liberalization of its economy, enacted new legislation to promote foreign
investment and concluded several multilateral, regional and bilateral
agreements.18 1 However, unlike many Latin American countries, the
Colombian judiciary has never been hostile to arbitration; rather, the
development of arbitration has been highly influenced by judicial
procedure. 182 The result is that "arbitrators rely on the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure and behave as if they were judges."' 83 Although a
new arbitration law was enacted in 1998,184 it may take some time for the
old interventionist culture to adapt to a more modern one based on the
autonomy of the parties and freedom to choose the rules of procedure.
To illustrate this dichotomy, the new Colombian arbitration law not
178 Charles W. Cookson II, Long-Term Direct Investment in Brazil, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REv. 345, 352 n.28 (2004) ("[t]he Court voted unanimously to accept the appeal and
certify the arbitration decision, having rejected arguments submitted by Justices Pertence,
Sanches and Moreira Alves which declared the unconstitutionality of the following sections
of Law 9.307/96: arts. 6 and 7; art. 41 ... and art. 42," translating S.T.F., No. 5206-7,
Relator: Ministro Sepulveda Pertence, 10/10/96 (Brazil)).
179 Although some of them have not yet been ratified. Among others, the Brasilia
Protocol for Dispute Resolution executed on December 17, 1991, the Colonia Protocol on
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments in the MERCOSUR signed on
January 17, 1994, the Protocol on Encouragement and Protection of Investments from Non-
members Countries of the MERCOSUR executed in Buenos Aires on August 5, 1994, and
the Las Lefias Protocol on Jurisdictional Cooperation and Assistance on Civil, Commercial,
Labor and Administrative Matters executed on June 27, 1992.
180 Blackaby & Noury, supra note 26, at 465.
181 Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, Colombia, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN
AMERICA, supra note 149, at 111-12.
182 Erika P. Schultz, Latin American Commercial Arbitration: The Colombian Approach,
9 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 295, 297 (1998).
183 Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 181, at 114.
184 Statute of Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, Decree No. 1818 (Col).
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only invests arbitrators with the authority to grant interim measures of
protection, but it also empowers them to enforce those measures without
requiring the assistance of a local court, giving them a sort of limited
imperium.185 Yet, in the same year, the Colombian Supreme Court refused
the recognition of a foreign partial award based on the grounds that partial
awards do not constitute final disposition of the issues concerned.
186
Like most Latin American countries, Peru has ratified all major
conventions on international commercial arbitration and passed a modem
law partially based on the Model Law, regarding both domestic and
international arbitration. 187  Furthermore, Peru amended its Constitution
acknowledging the jurisdictional nature of arbitration. 188 Notwithstanding
the clear and seemingly unambiguous language of the enacted legislation,
some courts do not observe the importance of respecting the parties'
freedom to submit their disputes to arbitration. At the request of the party
unwilling to arbitrate, courts have been known to interfere with the arbitral
proceeding in contradiction to the rules and regulations, denying the
independence of the arbitral proceedings.1
89
Panama provides the final and most striking example of a country
where courts play a strong role in influencing the role of international
arbitration. Arbitration has not been widely accepted as a means of dispute
settlement in Panama. 190  Many practitioners hesitate to submit their
disputes to arbitration under Panamanian law or in Panama as a seat of an
international arbitration, since arbitral awards are vulnerable to challenge
before the local courts. 191 This is due to the Panamanian Supreme Court's
holding on December 13, 2001, that the kompetenz-kompetenz principle,
one of the cornerstones of modern international arbitration, was
185 Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 181, at 122.
186 Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 181, at 128 (citing Supreme Court of Justice, Civil
Chamber, 11/12/1998, Exp. 7394).
187 Section one and section two of General Arbitration Law No. 26572, respectively. See
generally, Adrian Simon & John H. Ronney, The Law and Practice of International
Arbitration in Peru, 10 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 48 (1999).
188 Article 63 of the 1993 Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "The government and
other public law entities may submit disputes arising from contractual relationships to
tribunals established by virtue of existing treaties. They may also submit their disputes to
national or international arbitration in the manner provided by law." See Ulises Montoya A.,
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in Latin America: Peru, in ENFORCEMENT OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 73.
189 PAOLO DEL AGUILA RUIZ DE SOMOCURCIo, EL PODER JUDICIAL Y LOS CONTRATOS:
APUNTES SOBRE LA DEFENSA DEL FUERO ARBITRAL (2006) (in Spanish only), available at
http://www.camaralima.org.pe/arbitraje/boletin/vozsecretaria.htm.
190 Rogelio de la Guardia, The Arbitration Agreement in Panama, in ENFORCEMENT OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 65.
191 Id.
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unconstitutional under Panamanian law.192 The court affirmed that the issue
of jurisdiction was a question for the local courts, and not the arbitrators, to
decide. The court simply explained that the "arbitrators had no legal
standing to decide the propriety of their jurisdiction."
'1 93
2. Select Country Examples of Inconsistent Precedent Regarding
International Arbitration
Inconsistent decisions plague the development of consistent rules
governing international arbitration. As one author suggests, there should be
"a campaign promoting arbitration within the judiciary" in order for the
judiciary to better understand how international arbitration works and what
benefits it could bring to the judicial system, principally in reducing case
load.' 94 Examples are provided for the countries of Mexico and Venezuela.
While Mexico differs from the other country examples provided in this
section, in that Mexico has not ratified the ICSID Convention, Mexican
courts have favored enforcement of arbitral awards, 195 altering a history of
denying awards. 196 Recent cases have shown this trend as Mexican Courts
enforced agreements that provide for international arbitration
notwithstanding the unwillingness of the Mexican parties to abide by their
prior commitments. 197 Despite this unwillingness, in some cases the courts
unduly agree to hear disputes between parties who have validly agreed to
settle those disputes through arbitration.'9" For instance, not long ago, a
192 Supreme Court of Justice, 12/13/2001, PYCSA PANAMA, S. A. sidemanda de
inconstitucionalidad, available at http://bd.organojudicial.gob.pa/rjhtml/pleno/sn200112055
.htm.
193 A Setback in Latin American Arbitration, 13 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 152,
152 (2002).
194 Claus von Wobeser, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in Latin America:
Mexico, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 3, at
55, 63 [hereinafter Wobeser, Enforcement].
195 Volz & Haydock, supra note 18, at 891 (referring to two landmark cases decided in
1977, Malden Mills, Inc. v Hilaturas Lourdes S.A. and Presse Office S.A. v. Centro Editorial
Hoy S.A.).
196 See generally, Jeffrey J. Mayer, Recent Mexican Arbitration Reform: The Continued
Influence of the "Publicistas, " 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 913 (1993).
197 See e.g., Mitsui de Mexico S.A. and Mitsui & Co. v. Alkon Textil S.A., Corte
Superior de Justica, [C.S.J.] [Higher Court of Appeals] (Fourth Chamber), 06/21/1986, 16
Y.B. COM. ARB. 594, 598 (1991) (Mex.) (enforcing an arbitration clause that provided for
international arbitration in Japan under the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association's
rules); Wobeser, Enforcement supra note 194, at 62-63 (citing Nordson Corporation v.
Industrias Camer S.A. de C.V. (where a lower court decided to enforce the award and the
Constitutional Court in a separate action, juicio de amparo, denied reversing the judgment
because the enforcing court is not allowed to review substantive issues of the award)).
198 Claus von Wobeser, Mexico, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA,
supra note 149, at 155, 169-70 n.36 [hereinafter Wobesor, Mexico] (citing a case from the
Fourth Collegiate Circuit Court of Mexico where the High Court ignored the doctrine of
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Mexican court found it had jurisdiction to hear a case, even though the
parties had validly agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration. 199 In that
case, a Mexican company filed a suit against an American company before
the Mexican courts.200 The American company raised an objection to the
jurisdiction of the court based on the grounds that the parties had agreed to
arbitrate those disputes. 20 1 The court also decided to answer the claim ad-
cautelam in case the Mexican court decided that it had jurisdiction over the
case.20 2 The court viewed this answer as a waiver to arbitrate the disputes
since Mexican law did not recognize the possibility of alternative
pleading.20 3
Venezuela, too, is a party to all major conventions on international
commercial arbitration. It has also passed legislation adopting many of the
principles embodied in the Model Law. Venezuela's new Constitution
expressly recognizes arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution method
that shall be promoted by the state.20 4 Prior to passage of the new
Arbitration Law and the enactment of the new Constitution, the Venezuelan
Supreme Court was not consistent in its decisions regarding the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. In many cases, the court upheld its
jurisdiction even though the parties had agreed to submit their controversies
to arbitration.20 5  The same occurred with respect to the doctrine of
separability-determining that the invalidity of the main contract rendered
the arbitration clause contained therein unenforceable.20 6 Nevertheless,
since passage of the new arbitration law, the Superior Tribunal of
Venezuela (that replaced the Supreme Court) ratified the modem principles
incorporated in the arbitration law. For instance, in 2001, the Superior
Tribunal held that arbitral awards could not be appealed other than having
separability, stating that the decision to refer the parties to arbitration depended on the
validity of the underlying agreement).
199 Von Wobeser, Mexico supra note 149, at 59 (citing Operadora de Tintorerias Dona





204 Article 258 of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "The law
shall promote arbitration, conciliation, mediation and any other alternative means of settling
disputes." For a general discussion of the constitution, see Gregory Wilpert, Venezuelas
New Constitution, VenezuelaAnlaysis.com, available at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/
articles.php?artno=1003 (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
205 See Bernardo Weininger & David Lindsey, Venezuela, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 149, at 223, 229 & n.22.
206 Id. at 233 n.30 (citing the Supreme Court's decision in Compafiia An6nima de
Seguros La Occidental v. Stetzel, Thomson & Co. Ltd., 07/08/1993; as the authors remark,
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them set aside.20 7 The question is whether this recent trend will continue or
whether judicial independence will be affected when certain sensitive
interests are at stake.
VI. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE
CONTEXT OF ENERGY SECURITY
As noted, the implementation of an adequate legal framework
embracing international arbitration-adoption of international conventions
and the Model Law-was not sufficient to guarantee the development of a
culture of international arbitration in Latin America. There is no deeply-
rooted culture of arbitration in Latin America and policies discouraging the
use of international arbitration and enforcement of arbitral awards are re-
surfacing to impede foreign investment in energy sectors throughout the
region. This reduction in the legal certainty of the investment climate in
Latin American is particularly troubling at a time when concern for the
security of energy resources in Latin America is mounting in the United
States.
Energy security has several dimensions. One perspective is that the
United States' share of Latin American energy imports is threatened by
growing global competition for these resources. Latin America continues to
be a leading producer of oil and natural gas and a leading supplier to the
United States. In 2005, the United States consumed practically 20.7 million
barrels of oil per day ("mbd") with net oil imports accounting for 12.1 mbd
or fifty-eight percent of the total oil consumption, and 21.8 trillion cubic
feet ("tcf") of natural gas with net gas imports of nearly 3.6 tcf or seventeen
percent of total U.S. natural gas consumption.20 8  In the same year,
countries in the Western Hemisphere supplied the United States with forty-
nine percent of oil and petroleum product imports, nearly fifty percent of
U.S. crude oil imports and a good percentage of natural gas imports.
2 9
Even while most Latin American countries are net energy importers,2 |° the
countries of Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and
Bolivia are significant oil, gas, and ethanol producers and net energy
exporters in the Western Hemisphere. 1 Yet, concerns for the security of
our supply of energy resources from Latin America are in part fueled by
competition for these resources from China and India. Approximately one-
third of the increase of world demand for oil in 2004 is attributable to
207 Id. at 250 & n.62 (citing the Superior Tribunal's decision in Grupo Inmensa, C.A. v.
Soficrrdito Banco de Inversi6n, C.A., 05/23/2001).
208 See Sullivan & Riband, supra note 1 at 1.
209 Id.
210 See International Energy Agency, Map Energy Indicators, Latin America, Net
Imports, http://www.iea.org/Textbase/country/maps/LAMERICA/imports.htm.
211 id.
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China,21 2 and China will supersede the United States as the world's largest
oil consumer. However, there are no shortages of global oil and natural gas
reserves. Table 3 in Appendix III presents the reserves held by countries in
Latin America and illustrates that the largest oil and natural gas reserves are
in Argentina, Venezuela, and Mexico. The challenge is to match
investment with the location of the reserves, and there are other countries
that remain unexplored.21 3 At least forty years of conventional oil supply
and an additional forty years of unconventional supplies (in places largely
unexplored) exist.21 4 The challenge is to open up the places where those
reserves are available-to match the available technology and the
investment capital which is available to the places where the oil and gas can
be extracted. This is where concerns for nationalization are focused.
Concerns for energy security are principally rooted in hemispheric
developments surrounding resource nationalism. Resource nationalism has
raised concerns about access to energy resources and political interference
with the level of energy production and investment in the region.
215
Resource nationalism describes the global shift placing the world's oil
reserves under the control of national oil companies and out of reach of the
international oil companies, except on a low-margin, service-contract basis.
As noted in the Wall Street Journal, "ninety percent of the world's untapped
conventional oil reserves are in the hands of governments or state-owned oil
companies, exceeding the percentage recorded decades ago. 2 16  Other
analysts cite that moves toward resource nationalism made by countries like
Chad, Algeria, Great Britain, Bolivia, and Argentina will result in a full
resource nationalization.21 7 What is the extent of this phenomenon? Does it
affect the Western Hemisphere? And what is the connection between
resource nationalism and international arbitration?
Examples of resource nationalism have emerged in all the principal
areas of oil and natural gas production-in the Middle East, the former
212 See David Victor, Director Center for Environmental Science and Policy Program on
Energy and Sustainable Development, Stanford University, Remarks at the Council on
Foreign Relations Corporate Conference: The Global Energy Challenge (Mar. 11, 2005),
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/7961/global_energy_challenge.html.
213 See Nicholas Butler, Group Vice President of Strategy and Policy Development,
British Petroleum Co., Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations Corporate Conference:
The Global Energy Challenge (Mar. 11, 2005), available at http://www.cfr.org/
publication/7961/global-energychallenge.html.
214 Id.
215 See Sullivan & Riband, supra note 1.
216 Joshua Kurlantzick, The Coming Resource War: Crude Awakening, THE NEW
REPUBLIC (Oct. 2, 2006). available at http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/
pdblog-detail/060928-can-public-diplomacy-counter_resource_nationalism.
217 See Cyril Widdershoven, OPEC's Future Unclear: Production Costs and Resouce
Nationalization Ahead?, THE RESOURCE INVESTOR, (Sept. 15, 2006) available at
http://www.resourceinvestor.com/pebble.asp?relid=23854.
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Soviet Union, and Latin America. In Russia, resource nationalism emerged
with the acquisition of Gazprom and when Russia revoked an
environmental permit for a Royal Dutch Shell oil and gas project off the
country's Pacific coast. In Iran, President Ahmadinejad tightened state
control over the oil industry, promising to favor domestic investors and
placing close allies and former Revolutionary Guards in principal
218positions. In 2006, Chad confronted international operators Chevron,
Exxon Mobil, and Petronas, who have all shown the willingness to
negotiate their revenue share. 21 9 The Algerian government followed suit as
it decided, nearly a year after implementing a seemingly liberal and
transparent Hydrocarbon Law, to retreat from its liberal course
implementing a windfall tax (five to fifty percent) and lower production
shares resulting in major financial setbacks for three petroleum
companies-British Petroleum, Shell, and Total. °  In Latin America,
examples of resource nationalism can be found in Venezuela, Bolivia, and
Ecuador. In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez took control over the
formerly independent Petr6leos de Venezuela; in Bolivia, President Evo
Moralez mobilized army forces into Bolivian gas fields and nationalized
Bolivia's industry; 221 in Ecuador, the government assumed control of the
holdings of the U.S. oil company Occidental.222
As the leading oil and natural gas consumer in the world and a
significant importer of oil and natural gas from Latin America, the United
States is concerned with the hemispheric proliferation of resource
nationalism. Yet, one view is that resource nationalism will not endure in
some countries (where it is not written in the constitution as it is in
Venezuela and Mexico). One consideration is that resource nationalism is a
rent-seeking phenomenon fueled by price trends-countries consider
resource nationalism to make a profit from exploitation of their countries'
natural resources and then denounce resource nationalism when prices fall.
To be sure, resource nationalism in several Latin American energy-
producing countries has occurred concurrently with rising oil prices (from
ten dollars a barrel in 1999 to fifty dollars in 2006).223 Unsurprisingly,
resource nationalism has contributed to economic growth in the countries
218 See Kurlantzick, supra note 216.
219 See Widdershoven, supra note 217.
220 Id. (noting that in the last year, the Algerian Minister of Energy and Mines, Chakib
Khelil, has informed all operators in the country that it has toughened terms for foreign
energy investors. The new arrangement requires the Algerian-owned Sonatrach to take a
mandatory fifty-one percent share of all exploration and production ventures. At the same
time, a windfall tax between five and fifteen percent will be placed on revenues if crude oil
exceeds thirty dollars a barrel).
221 See Kurlantzick, supra note 216.
222 Id.
223 See Sullivan & Riband, supra note 1.
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which have adopted it, and the abnormal profits earned have been perceived
as offsetting the inefficiencies.
224
In 2006, Iran earned $45 billion in oil profits, marking the largest
profit amount since 1974.225 Russia's gross domestic product has climbed
from nearly $200 billion in 1999 to approximately $1 trillion today.226
Lastly, Venezuela has recorded some of the largest economic growth rates
around the globe-over nine percent in 2005.2A Given the level of these
earnings, the short term view is that, as additional oil and natural gas
production becomes available and prices fall, nationalism will diffuse.
Already in China there is evidence that rising demand for diesel fuel has
sparked an influx of capital and building of new power plants. 28
Others view resource nationalism as a longer-term phenomenon.
According to some analysts, the age of privatization of oil and natural gas
229production is gone, many of the world's attractive resources are in one
way or another "locked up by a state company or a company that behaves a
little bit like a state company,, 230 and the United States has to work with
state companies and seek the right relationships for doing so. 231 To be sure,
energy policy is on the agenda of nearly every country around the globe
showing that consuming countries are no longer willing to allow the energy
business to be run just on a free-market basis. 232 Investors seeking to invest
in countries where resource nationalism is taking place need to find
partnerships with state companies or various kinds of hybrid companies.
Some policy analysts also look to the potential role that low-cost sugarcane
producers can play in U.S. energy security.233 There has been much
congressional interest in the topic of hemispheric energy security in the
United States and related legislative initiatives in the 109th Congress, to
increase building partnerships with Latin America and to diversify energy
224 See Victor, supra note 212. (consider this as an example of the inefficiencies that arise
from nationalizing energy resources: using the Russia example, the dominance of Gazprom
in the Russia gas industry bodes poorly for investments in Russia because Russia is an
inefficient country. For every cubic meter of gas they consume, the Russian economy
produces $0.85 of value added. Canadians produce eight dollars of value added for every
cubic meter of gas that they consume and Fins produce thirty-five dollars of value added.
When prices decrease, inefficient investments will decrease).
225 See Kurlantzick, supra note 216.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 See Victor, supra note 212.
229 See Sullivan & Riband, supra note 1.
230 See Victor, supra note 212.
231 Id.
232 See Sullivan & Riband, supra note 1. See also Alexia Brunet & Meredith Shafe,
Beyond Enron: Regulation in Energy Derivatives Trading, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. AND Bus. 665,
669 (2007).
233 See Sullivan & Riband, supra note 1.
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supplies.234  Similarly, there has been considerable interest among U.S.
companies toward increasing hemispheric partnerships in Latin America as
a means of advancing hemispheric energy security.
International arbitration introduced a certain degree of predictability to
international transactions and a degree of consistency. Most of all, it
brought flexibility along with neutrality, which are paramount among
business people all over the world, particularly in the oil and energy
industries where investments are spread out all over the world, mainly in
unstable countries. The proliferation of resource nationalism throughout
Latin America may fuel a retreat to an era when arbitration was not an
available mechanism for settling disputes. As the previous section showed,
there is no deeply-rooted culture of arbitration in Latin America and there
are examples of instances where the judiciary in some Latin American
countries is not fulfilling the desires of the legislature in promoting
international arbitration. Investors already use many mechanisms to spread
risk-leveraging substantive size and the ability to invest simultaneously in
places like Russia and Angola and the Middle East and the United States all
at once, the ability to invest in this new technology and to take a long-term
view.236 Requiring investors to submit their disputes to domestic courts
would likely deter them from investing there, unless the rate of return
grossly exceeded the risk.
VII. CONCLUSION
Beginning in the late 1980s, Latin American countries abandoned their
traditional hostility towards international arbitration and began opening
their economies to foreign direct investment in the upstream and
downstream oil and natural gas sectors. With multiple investment
opportunities all over the world, international energy companies demanded
increased investment protections, not only insisting on substantive rights,
such as fair and equitable treatment and non-discrimination, but also
requiring that international fora be available to exercise those substantive
rights. As Table 1 in Appendix I shows, Latin American countries signed
and ratified all the necessary treaties to embrace international arbitration.
The cumulative impact of the international treaties, investment and trade
agreements that rely on arbitration to resolve international commercial
disputes, and efforts to enact international commercial arbitration statutes,
was increased foreign investment. To be sure, liberalization exposed Latin
American countries to international disputes which added a heavy burden-
both financially and politically-for many Latin American governments.
234 Id. at 18.
235 See Council of the Americas Report, Energy in the Americas, Building a Lasting
Partnership for Security and Prosperity, Oct. 2005.
236 See Sullivan & Riband, supra note 1.
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As Table 2 in Appendix II shows, beginning in 1990, there were an
increasing number of ICSID arbitrations against Latin American countries.
The increasing number of cases has had a negative impact in the evolution
of the arbitration of international energy and oil disputes.
Unlike in many other regions where arbitration enjoys wide cultural
acceptance, Latin America has been slow to develop a business arbitration
culture and, as noted earlier, a deeply-rooted tradition of international
arbitration has not developed. The judiciary has failed to apply the new
legislation in accordance with its intended purpose. Many governments are
currently reluctant to waive their domestic jurisdictions in favor of
international tribunals, fearing a post-financial crisis scenario like that of
Argentina, when arbitrations soared.237 While some Latin American
countries, such as Argentina and Venezuela, have challenged the validity of
ICSID arbitration under their national constitutions,238 many governments
feel that the rights and guarantees accorded to foreign investors outnumber
the benefits received from their investments. The proliferation of resource
nationalism discussed in the prior section only impedes and does not further
efforts to promote international arbitration.
For arbitration to develop in Latin America, certain steps need to be
taken. Most local practitioners still remain suspicious of the benefits of
arbitration and continue to rely on the formalistic approaches of litigation.
Thus, there is very little arbitration expertise either among lawyers or
judges. The change in culture is a slow process that will start to yield
results only after local practitioners and judges are educated as to the
benefits of supporting arbitration as a valid alternative to litigation.
However, these changes alone without a change in the legal education
leading to an acceptance of arbitration culture can do little to improve the
practice of international arbitration in general and the chances of
successfully enforcing arbitration agreements and awards in particular. The
development of an arbitration culture calls for the insertion of international
arbitration courses as a fundamental part of the legal education with the
hope that academic training will provide local practitioners a familiarity
with international conventions and internationally recognized principles
which will in turn, allow practitioners to make informed decisions when
determining whether to litigate or arbitrate a dispute.2 3 9  Furthermore,
237 Yackee, supra note 48, at 224; see also Carlos E. Alfaro & Pedro M. Lorenti, The
Growing Opposition of Argentina to ICSID Arbitral Tribunals: A Conflict Between
International and Domestic Law?, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 417 (June 2005);
Carlos E. Alfaro, Argentina: ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged by the Argentine
Government (Dec. 21, 2004), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=30151 &search
results= 1 &login=true.
238 See Blanco, supra note 50, for a discussion of the constitutional challenge for the case
of Argentina.
239 See generally on arbitration culture, Tom Ginsburg, The Culture of Arbitration, 36
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development of international arbitration in Latin America will also require
efforts to develop applicable substantive and procedural laws, which must
all be considered and addressed in the contract to avoid uncertainty caused
by a process that allows the arbitrators to create rules during the process. 240
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1335 (2003).
240 See Blanco, supra note 50 (noting the development of laws such as: admission of
documentary evidence and witness interrogation during the arbitration hearing, time
allocations, pre-hearing discovery, allocation of attorneys' costs and fees, rules on privileges,
and post-arbitration award enforcement mechanisms).
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APPENDIX I
Table 1: Adoption Dates
International Arbitration, BITs
America as of April, 2006.
of International Conventions Fostering
and UNCITRAL Model Law in Latin
ICSID New York Panama BITs UNCITRAL
State Convention Convention Convention Model Law
Date Ratified Date Ratified Date Ratified Total Total Adopted (YIN)
Signed Ratified
Argentina 1994 1989 1994 58 53 N
Bolivia 1995 1995 1998 22 18 Y (with changes)
Brazil No 2002 1995 14 0 Y (with major
changes)
Chile 1991 1975 1976 51 37 Y
Colombia 1997 1979 1986 6 0 Y (with changes)
Costa Rica 1993 1988 1978 19 13 Y (with changes)
Cuba No 1975 No 57 28 N
Dominican Not ratified 2002 Not ratified 13 5 N
Republic
Ecuador 1986 1962 1991 28 21 Y (with changes)
El Salvador 1984 1998 1980 24 20 Y (with changes)
Guatemala 2003 1984 1986 12 4 Y
Haiti Not ratified 1984 No 5 3 No
Honduras 1989 2001 1976 5 2 Y (with changes)
Mexico No 1971 1978 17 12 Y
Nicaragua 1995 2003 Not ratified 18 11 N
Panama 1996 1985 1975 16 11 Y (with changes)
Paraguay 1983 1998 1976 24 19 Y
Peru 1993 1988 1989 28 25 Y
Uruguay 2000 1983 1977 28 21 N
Venezuela 1995 1995 1985 25 21 Y (with changes)
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the information available at
the websites of the following institutions: ICSID
(http://www.worldbank.org/icsid), UNCITRAL (http://www.uncitral.org),
UNCTAD (http://www.unctad.org) and SICE (http://www.sice.oas.org).
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APPENDIX II
Table 2: ICSID cases filed against Latin American countries as of
April 2006 (countries with largest number of disputes are in bold and
italics)
BITs ICSID Cases ICSID Cases
Concluded PendingState
Energy Energy
Ratified Total Related Total Related
Argentina 53 6 4 35 18
Bolivia 18 1 0 1 1
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0
Chile 37 0 0 3 0
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0
Costa Rica 13 1 0 0 0
Cuba 28 0 0 0 0
Dominican Republic 5 0 0 0 0
Ecuador 21 1 0 5 5
El Salvador 20 0 0 1 0
Guatemala 4 0 0 0 0
Haiti 3 0 0 0 0
Honduras 2 1 0 0 0
Mexico 12 6 0 7 0
Nicaragua I1 0 0 0 0
Panama 11 0 0 0 0
Paraguay 19 1 0 0 0
Peru 25 1 1 2 1
Uruguay 21 0 0 0 0
Venezuela 21 3 0 3 1
Totals 324 21 5 57 26
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the information available at
the ICSID website as of April 26, 2006, http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/cases/cases.htm.
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APPENDIX III
Table 3: Latin American Energy Sources and Imports, ICSID Energy-
Related Cases and Arbitration Difficulties Cited (countries with arbitration
difficulties cited in Section V. are noted in the right column; countries
experiencing resource nationalism cited in Section
italics).
VI. are in bold and
U.S. Crude Oil Imports, Proven Reserves,
State 2005 2005 ISCD
Annual Percentage Oil Natural Cases Arbitration
(Thousand of Total (Billion Gas Pending, Difficulties
Barrels) U.S. Barrels) (Trillion Energy Cited, 2006
Crude Oil Cubic Ft) Related
I mports 2006
Argentina 20,608 1.67 2.320 18.866 18 Yes
Bolivia 264 0.021 0.002 0.005 1
Brazil 34,459 2.79 11.243 11.515 - Yes
Chile - - 0.150 3.460 Yes
Colombia 57,002 4.62 1.542 4.040 Yes




Ecuador 100,681 8.16 4.630 0.345 -
El Salvador - - - - 5
Guatemala 3,885 0.315 0.526 0.109 -
Haiti - - - -
Honduras - - - -
Mexico 565,919 45.879 12.882 15.985 Yes
Nicaragua - - - -
Panama Yes
Paraguay - - - - -
Peru 1,501 0.122 0.929 8.723* 1 Yes
Uruguay - - - - - Yes
Venezuela 449,196 36.41 79. 729** 151.395 1 Yes
Total LatinAea 1,233,515 33.6 115.114 282.056 -America
Total U.S.
Imports 3,670,403 100.00 1,292.550 6,112.144
Worldwide
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Source: Prepared by the authors based on the following information:
U.S. Crude Oil Imports from Western Hemisphere Countries, 2005 from
U.S. Department of Energy, .Energy Information Administration; Proven
Oil and Gas Reserves 2005 taken from Oil & Gas Journal, "Worldwide
Look at Reserves and Production," December 2005; Pending ICSID Cases,
Energy-Related prepared using ICSID website as of April 26, 2006,
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm; Arbitration
Difficulties Cited Based on Discussion found in Section V.
Notes: *Peru's proven natural gas reserves reportedly could increase to
15-16 tcf upon completion of seismic work on a block of the Camisea Gas
Project. See U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, "Country Analysis Briefs: Peru," May, 2006. **This
amount does not include as much as 270 billion barrels of extra heavy
Venezuelan crude oil.
